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Abstract: In this paper I assess the relation between philosophy of chemistry 
and (general) philosophy of science, focusing on those themes in the philoso-
phy of chemistry that may bring about major revisions or extensions of cur-
rent philosophy of science. Three themes can claim to make a unique contri-
bution to philosophy of science: first, the variety of materials in the (natural 
and artificial) world; second, extending the world by making new stuff; and, 
third, specific features of the relations between chemistry and physics.  
Keywords: philosophy of science, philosophy of chemistry, interdiscourse relations, 
making stuff, variety of substances. 
1. Introduction 
Chemistry is unique and distinguishes itself from all other sciences, with 
respect to three broad issues: 
• A (variety of) stuff perspective, requiring conceptual analysis of the 
notion of stuff or material (Sections 4 and 5). 
• A making stuff perspective: the transformation of stuff by chemical 
reaction or phase transition (Section 6). 
• The pivotal role of the relations between chemistry and physics in 
connection with the question how everything fits together (Section 7). 
All themes in the philosophy of chemistry can be classified in one of these 
three clusters or make contributions to general philosophy of science that, as 
yet, are not particularly different from similar contributions from other sci-
ences (Section 3). I do not exclude the possibility of there being more than 
three clusters of philosophical issues unique to philosophy of chemistry, but 
I am not aware of any as yet. Moreover, highlighting the issues discussed in 
Sections 5-7 does not mean that issues reviewed in Section 3 are less im-
portant in revising the philosophy of science. Section 2 briefly summarizes 
causes of the neglect of chemistry in the philosophy of the sciences (plural!). 
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Three categories are needed to order materials in the natural world or pro-
duced in the laboratory or chemical industry (Section 4):1 (thermodynamic) 
phases, (macroscopic) chemical substances, (molecular-scale) chemical spe-
cies.  
 If chemistry had been the ‘first science’ in the philosophy of science, that 
would primarily have meant the addition of the clusters reviewed in Sections 
5 and 6 as well as rather different research programs for the existing theme of 
‘how everything fits into one world’ (Section 7). Some of the issues reviewed 
in Sections 5-7 are important additions to philosophy of science; some issues 
substantially change existing themes in the philosophy of science. An im-
portant example of the latter is the notion of natural kind. 
 The issues here presented as philosophically importantly different or 
unique as to chemistry, apply to experimental physics and/or materials sci-
ence to a considerable extent as well. Traditionally, physical chemistry (in-
cluding chemical thermodynamics, quantum chemistry, phase theory, colloid 
science, electrochemistry, surface chemistry) is part of chemistry.2 In addi-
tion, in the broad view of philosophy of chemistry advocated in this paper, 
most of ‘materials science’ is included (characterization and production of 
composite materials, polymers, metal alloys, ceramics, biomaterials, semicon-
ductors), as well as parts of solid state physics, chemical engineering science, 
pharmaceutical technology, nanotechnology, molecular biology, biomedical 
sciences, earth sciences (geology, mineralogy, petrology), and environmental 
sciences.3 
 This paper is primarily based on recent post-2000 publications in philoso-
phy of chemistry. For reviews of pre-2000 publications see Schummer 2006a 
and van Brakel 2000.4 History of chemistry and chemical education is not 
included in this paper. Some views or relevant publications will only be men-
tioned in passing. There is no space for critically discussing all of them. 
2. The neglect of the philosophy of chemistry 
Until about 1960, English-language dominated philosophy of science mainly 
consisted of philosophy of physics. In the eighteen parts of the Foundations 
of the Unity of Science: Toward an International Encyclopedia of Unified Sci-
ence, published between 1938 and 1970, the only references to chemistry can 
be found in Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) 
and, significantly, a few pages on chemical bonding in Philipp Frank’s contri-
bution on the foundation of physics (1946).5  
 There is extensive literature discussing the possible causes of the neglect 
of chemistry in the philosophy of science and there may be some truth in 
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every suggestion made. I suggest the major long-term cause is the highly 
influential pronouncements on the status of chemistry by first Kant and 
more recently Dirac (van Brakel 2006, pp. 71-2).  
 Pre-1960 interest by philosophers of science was almost exclusively in 
theoretical science. Putting the emphasis slightly differently, physics and 
chemistry were lumped together as exact natural sciences with focus on stud-
ying its logical structure. This meant that the interest was in laws in the sense 
of mathematical equations stating relations between quantities and theories 
that were axiomatic, at least in principle. Mainstream philosophy of science 
simply regarded chemistry as part of physics and an unimportant part at that, 
the general impression being that with the quantum mechanical interpreta-
tion of the chemical bond, chemistry had been reduced to physics. If there 
might have been some philosophy of chemistry in the pre-quantum era, with 
the advent of quantum mechanics, it became irrelevant at one fell swoop. 
This applied in particular to the German Naturphilosophen and the British 
emergentists. 
 Chemical examples might be used in the philosophy of science or even in 
other parts of philosophy.6 But usually such examples had little to do with 
what might be considered typically chemical. Still, in the 1960s a few isolated 
publications focusing more specifically on chemistry appeared. Most of them 
can be seen as reporting falsifications of universal features of ‘the’ method of 
science. For example, it was reported that received views on theory and ex-
planation and their relation to experimental data were not confirmed by 
chemical practice. However, neither the republication in 1962 of Paneth’s 
1931 article, nor the contribution of Caldin (1961), both in the British Jour-
nal for the Philosophy of Science, received any lasting follow up. 
 Authors defending the autonomy of chemistry and its philosophy, might 
still start by saying philosophy of science is taught around the world from a 
positivistic perspective (Bensaude-Vincent & Simon 2008, p. 4). However, 
since the 1970s this is not true anymore. At present philosophy of science is 
fragmented in many approaches, without any dominant grand narrative. Dif-
ferent strands emerged in the philosophy of science and there has been some 
impact from other traditions (such as phenomenology and French philoso-
phy of science). Interest arose in historical case studies to provide arguments 
for and against the rationality of scientific progress or development, both 
within philosophy of science ‘proper’ and in the sociology (or anthropology) 
of science. As a consequence, the number of papers on the history of chemis-
try that included some philosophical considerations increased considerably. 
 Interest in the experimental side of natural science developed, as well as a 
reaction against the bias within philosophy of science towards (formal) theo-
ry. This development also favored the appearance of more references to 
chemists. In Hacking’s Representing and Intervening (1983) there are discus-
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sions of Boyle, Dalton, Davy, and Lavoisier, as well as references to Berzeli-
us, Brønsted, Kekulé, Lewis, Pasteur, William Prout, and von Liebig. In 
Latour’s Science in Action (1987) there are more references to Crick, Mende-
leev, and Pasteur than to Einstein, Newton, and Copernicus.  
 These changes in mainstream philosophy of science started to have some 
impact on restoring the balance between chemistry and physics in philosoph-
ical discourse. However the more influential contributions focused on physi-
cal case studies. Moreover, many chemical case studies are not concerned 
with what might be specific to chemistry. Usually they ‘test’ positions in 
general philosophy of science (‘models’ of Popper, Lakatos, Laudan, Hack-
ing, Latour, etc.).  
 It was only in the 1990s, due to a variety of contingent factors (van Brakel 
2012a, pp. 40-1), that philosophy of chemistry emerged, first in several Euro-
pean countries, leading to a truly international endeavor in the recent decade. 
In the late 1990s, six conference proceedings appeared, dedicated to philoso-
phy of chemistry,7 and from 2000 onwards, there were not only two journals 
catering for the philosophy of chemistry, but an increasing number of phi-
losophy of chemistry papers appeared in mainstream philosophy journals.  
 However, the days of neglect are not over, as the following typical exam-
ples show. In the highly acclaimed Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues 
(Curd & Cover 1998, second edition 2012), a selection of about 50 articles 
representing the philosophy of science, there is not a single article from the 
philosophy of chemistry.8 Chemistry is mentioned about 50 times in the 
context of a brief reference to the ‘chemical revolution’.9 Otherwise the word 
‘chemistry’ often occurs in the phrase ‘physics and chemistry’, when talking 
about science in general, but there is no serious reference to chemistry of the 
twentieth century. Typically, when the author of one article writes: “the only 
‘genuine’ theories will be found in physics and chemistry” (Resnik 1998, p. 
1182), the editors, in their discussion of this article, change the author’s opin-
ion to “theories are confined to physics and perhaps chemistry” (Curd & 
Cover 1998, p. 1266, emphasis added). 
 Also in the context of history and philosophy of science, physics and 
chemistry are often mentioned in one breath. But the overall terminology of 
the discourse shows no signs of chemistry being a science in its own right. 
For example, Galison, in a 2008 article in the journal Isis proposing “ten 
problems in history and philosophy of science”, often mentions chemistry 
(and biology, and earth sciences, and physics), but when he raises the ques-
tion, “what counts as purity in mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology?”, 
the author is not thinking of pure substances in chemistry (but of the distinc-
tion between pure and ‘impure’ science).10 
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3. Contributions to general philosophy of science 
In this Section I list a number of themes in general philosophy of science to 
which philosophy of chemistry can make important contributions changing 
the face of philosophy of science. Some of the themes reviewed here may still 
develop into unique contributions of philosophy of chemistry to philosophy 
of science. 
 There is a considerable range of concepts in chemistry that warrant con-
ceptual analysis, as ‘rough ground’ for the philosophy of chemistry (and 
chemical education).11 In addition to laying the foundations of chemistry, 
these concepts warrant analysis because they bear on the main themes dis-
cussed in subsequent Sections. However, the method of conceptual analysis 
in the philosophy of chemistry is not much different from conceptual analy-
sis with respect to other discourses.12 
 It has been remarked that chemistry has no procedure for doing science 
(e.g. falsification); the connecting thread is a continuing story or making up 
stories (Hoffmann 2007). This suggestion has also been made with respect to 
other sciences. A more specific feature of chemistry is that its development 
does not merely consists in new explanations, theories, and the refinement of 
methodology, but also in making new materials (see Section 7). 
 Philosophy of chemistry offers several interesting case studies for the 
realism debate, for example the question whether orbitals ‘exist’ (Labarca & 
Lombardi 2010, Mulder 2010).13 The latter issue is also relevant for the notion 
of observation (Mulder 2011, Ogilvi 2011). In general, chemistry will suggest 
a more realistic metaphysics than other sciences, because it is making things. 
However, in the philosophy of chemistry no ‘new’ notions of realism have 
been proposed, which is not surprising as there are already about twenty 
varieties in general philosophy of science (not counting realisms in other 
parts of philosophy).14 
 Philosophy of chemistry has shown that simple forms of essentialist real-
ism are falsified by chemistry. Soon after the influential publications by 
Kripke and Putnam, their defense of essences discovered by science being a 
posteriori and necessary was criticized, because of overlooking the rough 
ground of chemical knowledge (Mellor 1977, van Brakel 1986, 1990).15 Later 
publications added more detail, in particular concerning features of water, but 
there has been a lot of repetition as well.16  
 Chemistry may provide important case studies undermining the distinc-
tion of primary and secondary qualities (Bhushan & Rosenfeld 2000, p. 8; 
Earley 2003b). Different techniques will only determine the same shape (of a 
molecule) if they operate at the same time scale (Ramsey 2000).17 The shape 
of molecules does not neatly fall in either the primary or secondary category.  
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 Repeatability and reproducibility in experimental chemistry is somewhat 
different from other experimental sciences (Plesch 1999), but does not raise 
particularly new issues. The issue of ontological commitments in the design 
of instruments (for example as used in analytic chemistry) and properties 
being highly responsive to techniques of instrumentation (Rothbart 2000) is 
equally relevant to other experimental sciences such as biology and psycholo-
gy.  
 There is no consensus as to what qualifies as a chemical law, emphasizing 
either that there are few (laws of definite, multiple, and reciprocal propor-
tions) or many (all chemical equations). The periodic system of elements has 
been referred to as a central law, model, or theory of chemistry, but it may 
also be considered a classification that organizes a vast amount of infor-
mation and is capable of making testable predictions (Scerri 2012, p. 329f). In 
the latter understanding it forms part of the semiotics of chemical space (see 
Section 6). Perhaps in view of the cachet of philosophy of chemistry, it might 
be wiser to present the periodic system as a major fundamental law of nature 
that lies at the basis of the unlimited variety of chemical substances and their 
transformations.18 More relevant to our theme is that it is a philosophically 
interesting law because it is primarily a case of non-mathematical and non-
linguistic representation.19  
 It has been argued with some force that whatever chemical laws there 
might be, they will always have exceptions and are only valid in limited cir-
cumstances.20 Water boils at 100oC, but not always (Chang 2007, van Brakel 
1986). Hence, chemical laws are not universal in some strict sense. Main-
stream philosophy of science and philosophy of mind assume that (theoreti-
cal) physics is the only science concerned with strict laws; all other sciences 
are special sciences, where we find only ceteris paribus laws, as in chemistry. 
However, this traditional view, almost universally shared among philosophers 
and other people, has been thoroughly criticized by Cartwright (1999), who 
has defended the view that all (theoretical) laws are ceteris paribus. She has 
argued that theoretical (fundamental) laws apply to models, which, strictly 
speaking do not exist in the real world. Models deliberately construct falsifi-
cations of ‘reality’ so that theory can deal with them. Philosophy of chemis-
try can provide ample evidence to support this view (van Brakel 2004, pp. 27-
30). Moreover, contrary to Cartwright’s view, phenomenological laws are 
ceteris paribus as well (van Brakel 2012c, p. 543). Phenomenological equations 
apply to phenomenological models, which deliberately construct falsifica-
tions of ‘reality’, hoping that nevertheless the model will allow sufficiently 
adequate predictions of some piece of reality. At best the phenomenological 
models apply to their material realizations in highly regimented laboratory 
conditions.21 If chemistry would have been the main focus in philosophy of 
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science, the chapter on scientific laws would have been very different, but 
this can also be said of other ‘special’ sciences. 
 Approximations (in quantum chemistry, with respect to pure substances, 
in chemical engineering science) are ubiquitous, but not unique to chemistry. 
As in other sciences there are many different kinds of models employed in 
chemistry.22 Most uses are not significantly different from the use of models 
in other sciences. There are two possible exceptions. First, there is the con-
ceptual notion of pure substances as a model of chemical substances and 
reference point for all materials (Section 5). Second, there is the created reali-
ty in the laboratory or chemical industry as a model of the messy reality out-
there, providing ‘ideal’ boundary conditions (contexts) for chemical reactions 
and down-stream processing (isolation and purification of products).23 Mod-
els in chemistry and chemical engineering fit, in particular, bits of the world 
inside laboratories or the chemical industry, where the idealized boundary 
conditions can be approximated. 
 Mereology can be applied to many sciences (Calosi & Graziani 2014). 
Also chemistry does not fit easily in classical mereology (which the simpli-
fied notion of atoms in molecules might suggest) and many modifications 
and extensions have already been proposed. Philosophers of chemistry may 
make new contributions to mereology as a theme in mathematical logic. Is-
sues raised as requiring extensions or revisions of classical mereology in-
clude:24 
• Individuals enter combinations of interesting sorts. They no longer are 
the very same individuals that existed prior to the composition.25  
• Quantities of matter cannot always be considered a collection of mol-
ecules or atoms. Temporal and modal parameters have to be taken into 
account. 
• Different mereological partitionings of a molecule are possible. This 
may lead to different conceptions of ‘atom in a molecule’. 
• Open-system dynamic coherences are defined by their capacities to act 
on their surroundings, which is difficult to fit in.26 
• Parts and wholes differ depending on the levels of calculation or the 
apparatus being used. 
Several authors have pointed out the special role of visual representation 
(diagrammatic representation, structural formulae) in chemistry.27 Sophisti-
cated representational schemes may be paradigmatically explanatory: “with-
out the diagrammatic and graphical techniques, the mathematical results 
would have remained largely sterile” (Woody 2012, p. 457). Because structur-
al formulae are not truth bearers, they cannot function as premises in a DN-
scheme (Goodwin 2009b).28 Formulae are both descriptive names and mod-
els. They describe the composition, connectivity, and spatial arrangement. 
However, figures, pictures, diagrams are ubiquitous in many sciences. The 
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use of diagrammatic non-linguistic representation in chemistry, raises the old 
question of the necessity of models for explanation (Hesse 1966). 
 Already in the 1960s it was reported that chemical explanation does not 
fit Hempel’s deductive-nomological model of explanation (Churchman & 
Buchanan 1969). However, notwithstanding a whole volume on chemical 
explanation (Earley 2003a), it seems that explanation in chemistry only 
changes the relative plausibility of different existing theories of explanation, 
not that chemical explanation as such is unique. Different authors in philoso-
phy of chemistry have advocated various causal theories of explanation,29 have 
followed Bas van Fraassen’s (1980) pragmatic stance with respect to explana-
tion, or even used Hempel’s deductive-nomological scheme (Hettema 
2012a). Cartwright’s elaborations of the notion of capacity might be relevant 
as well to explanation in chemistry. For the moment the jury is still out on 
the issue of chemical explanation; “it is too early for any consensus to have 
emerged” (Akeroyd 2008, p. 39). “None of the standard accounts of explana-
tion fits this case neatly, and yet all of them seem somehow relevant” 
(Woody 2012, p. 462). The latter may well apply to other cases and disci-
plines. 
 Traditional philosophy of science regards theoretical reasoning, based on 
the example of Euclidian geometry, as the hallmark of a mature science.30 
There is, however, a parallel tradition of practical reasoning based on specific 
cases that goes back to Aristotle. Chemistry is less concerned with ‘pure’ 
theoretical knowledge than with practical control and change of poetic prac-
tices, i.e. practices that aim at the production of material goods (Janich 1994). 
Schummer (1997b) argued that chemistry challenges the distinction between 
natural science and technology.31 Bensaude-Vincent (2009, p. 166) has sug-
gested that chemistry is not a natural science, but “a cornucopia of material 
technologies”. But one should not too quickly associate chemistry with tech-
nology. Although for both action is central, most of technology is concerned 
with the design and production of ‘things’ composed of parts made of exist-
ing materials which have already been given a specific form. In contrast, 
chemical and material engineering, if considered technology, are concerned 
with the production of (bulk) materials out of other stuff. In the case of 
chemistry (or chemical technology) the distinction between artificial and 
natural kinds is undermined (see Section 6), which is not typical for most 
technology. One can argue that chemical knowledge is at the same time epis-
temic and theoretical, even transcendental, as well as knowledge directly use-
ful for making stuff. However, the issue of science, technoscience, technolo-
gy, and techniques can be addressed with respect to many sciences (including 
physics and social sciences).32 
 Many developments in nanotechnoscience can be seen as an extension of 
interface/surface chemistry, which involves the study of thin molecular layers 
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adjacent to interfaces and therefore may be considered interphases. Molecular 
nanotechnology, i.e., producing molecular devices, is not fundamentally dif-
ferent from supramolecular chemistry that emerged earlier, without being 
called nanotechnology (Schummer 2006b). Surface chemists involved in nan-
otechnology are basically doing the same thing as what they were doing half a 
century ago. More important, but not an issue for the philosophy of chemis-
try, is the undermining of the distinction between technology and the (natu-
ral) process of biological evolution and ‘life’. 
 Chemical research, whether in academia or in industry, whether pure or 
applied, has ethically relevant aspects. But these issues are not fundamentally 
different from the general theme of science and ethics/society. Questions 
such as what to research and what to make (and how) have often neglected 
ethical or political aspects, but this is so for all science in one way or another. 
Concern about safety or sustainable development is relevant to many scienc-
es. It has been suggested that predicting the properties of new chemical sub-
stances is radically incomplete and therefore raises specific ethical questions 
in connection with their consequential properties and effects (Schummer 
2001, pp. 110-1; 2010, p. 180). However, description, prediction and conse-
quences of adding artifacts to the world are always incomplete. Radical in-
completeness is not more incomplete than incompleteness. The Problem of 
Complete Description (called the frame problem in Artificial Intelligence) 
applies across the board and is a necessary feature of all knowledge and prac-
tices (van Brakel 1992b). 
 By comparing chemistry to art, chemists have made claims concerning the 
aesthetic value, even beauty, of some of their products. Here chemistry 
makes a novel contribution to aesthetics,33 but does not require major chang-
es in aesthetic and/or semiotic discourse. 
4. Three basic categories: Phases, substances, species 
This Section is a terminological intermezzo in preparation of Sections 5- 7.34 
 Chemistry can be defined as the science of the characteristics of (macro-
scopic) materials or phases (including phase transitions) and their containing 
(molecular-scale) species, as well as the (planned) interaction of these materi-
als with other materials (synthesis, chemical transformations, separation 
methods). Three ontological categories are needed to bring some order to the 
variety of materials: the notion of phase, the notion of (pure) chemical sub-
stance, and the notion of chemical species, which are closely intertwined, but 
not reducible to one another.35 I am not claiming that this is the only ‘true’ 
way of ordering the ontology of chemistry. Other proposals are welcome. 
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 Materials can be divided into (heterogeneous) conglomerates (of phases) 
and (homogeneous) phases.36 A phase is a homogeneous body of continuous 
matter that is characterized by its chemical composition and thermodynamic 
state without regard to its size or shape or any atomistic assumption concern-
ing constituting species (Gibbs 1931).37 A phase consists of one or more 
substances and a substance may occur in more than one phase.38 Apart from 
solid and liquid phases and the gas phase, there are many other kinds of phas-
es, for example amorphous,39 colloid, and superfluid phases; stable non-
stoichiometric phases and metastable phases.40 The notion of phase brings 
with it the phase rule and the notion of component (in the sense of the phase 
rule).41 The latter notion is different from that of chemical substance and 
chemical species. The number of components and the number of substances 
in a quantity of matter is not always the same.  
 Prototypical pure substances occur in at least one solid phase, a liquid 
phase, and a gas phase and can also be defined/identified in terms of their 
one-component-phase diagram, triple point(s) ‘connecting’ the phases.42 
Many substances have a considerable number of different solid phases (in 
particular at high pressures and/or low temperatures). Binary phase diagrams 
may contain many intermediate compounds.43 Substances can be divided into 
pure (stoichiometric) substances (compounds and simple substances), inter-
mediate substances (including addition compounds), non-stoichiometric 
compounds,44 and, perhaps separately,45 one-phase only materials. The dis-
tinction between these subclasses of substances is rather fuzzy.  
 A pure substance can also be defined as a substance of which properties of 
two coexisting phases remain invariant during a phase transition, which takes 
place at a constant temperature (and pressure). If the phase transition is also 
reversible, it will be referred to as a classical phase transition.46 If a homoge-
neous material does not meet the criterion of classical phase transition, it is a 
mixture of substances, called a solution. Solutions are phases containing more 
than one substance.47 An impure substance is a solution. Hence the phrase 
‘(chemical) substance’ always refers to the ideal of a pure substance. Phases 
can be separated by mechanical methods. Solutions can be separated by 
thermodynamic methods, for example distillation.48 Homogeneity is relative 
to accuracy and scale of observation. Hence, the border between solutions 
and conglomerates is fuzzy. 
 Operationally a (simple or compound) substance is pure if it is perfectly 
homogeneous after being subjected to successive modes of fractionating 
which are as different as possible and when attempts at further separa-
tion/purification produce no further change in properties. Later refinements 
may show that what was once thought to be a pure substance is, after all, not 
pure. The ideal pure substance would pass all types of ideal purification tests, 
i.e. tests with unlimited resolution. Separation and purification reduce the 
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continuity of materials to a discrete ordering of pure substances, thus provid-
ing a frame of reference to locate substances and their transformations.49 The 
chemist’s models for pure substances rarely apply to the natural world.50 
Chemists make substances in the laboratory and put them in bottles, in order 
to further investigate them. Therefore Schummer suggests, “the material 
world is thus adjusted to the conceptual needs” (2010, p. 168). This feature 
may be extended to the chemical industry (van Brakel 2012c). 
 Homogeneous materials with the same chemical composition can be dif-
ferent substances (isomers, stereoisomers, enantiomers, polymers, tauto-
mers).51 The same substance may occur in more than one liquid or solid phase 
(polymorphs, allotropes). The number of substances is not always easy to 
determine, depending on the interpretation of phase diagrams and chemical 
species the system contains. 
 Perhaps we should limit the notion of substance to what can exist inde-
pendently in containers or is (sufficiently) similar to species that can.52 As to 
the latter, consider einsteiniumastatide, EsAt3. Einsteinium and astanium are 
simple substances, but occur in such small quantities that producing macro-
scopic quantities of EsAt3 is out of the question. Nobelium only exists in the 
form of a few atoms at a time. By extension we might consider cases like this 
‘theoretical’ substances, even though they do not fit the operational defini-
tions. Substances or species that exist in only one phase, easily decompose, 
only occur in solution, etc. can only be included by analogy. 
 Chemical substances defined operationally in terms of a sequence of puri-
fication/separation methods should be distinguished from chemical species 
(typically identified using spectroscopic techniques).53 Chemical species are 
hypothetical constituents of substances or phases, such as molecules, ions, 
radicals, oligomolecular and supramolecular aggregates, atoms in ordered or 
disordered solid structures, held together by various types of interactions 
(ionic, covalent, metallic bonds; hydrogen bonding, ion pairing, metal-to-
ligand binding, spin-spin interaction, van der Waals attractive forces, etc.). 
 Often a substance contains many species (in equilibrium). A material, 
phase, or substance has a (macroscopic) chemical composition and a (mo-
lecular) species composition. The range of species present depends on tem-
perature, pressure, and other contextual variables. Philosophers often incor-
rectly identify a pure substance with one particular species. Water is not a 
collection of H2O molecules. 
 Chemical (molecular) species that cannot be put into bottles, cannot be 
subjected to any reversible phase transition, occur only in solutions or other 
special environments,54 only ‘exist’ in excited stages, or have an extremely 
short half-life, may have a full claim to being a chemical species, but may not 
claim to be (pure) substances. If the species only exist in equilibrium with 
other species ‘inside’ pure substances or solutions,55 or figure only in reaction 
22 Jaap van Brakel 
 
mechanisms and cannot be separated as independent substances, they can be 
accepted as (hypothetical) species, but not as substances. This includes radi-
cals, reactive fragments, activated complexes, ligand-receptor complexes.  
 Although a tautomer may contain two species as different as ethyne C2H2 
and benzene C6H6, under particular experimental conditions, the dynamic 
isomer may have a triple point and meet other criteria of being one substance 
and one component in the sense of the phase rule. Usually substances have a 
more independent existence in a way that many species have not, but also 
substances have a limited range of existence. 
 Enantiomers may form racemic mixtures and in solution may display 
rapid racemisation.56 The two pure enantiomers have identical thermodynam-
ic properties and most other properties, including phase behavior and reac-
tion rates with achiral reagents, are identical. Because of the entropy of mix-
ing, a racemate is more stable than either enantiomer. Differences between 
optical isomers arise in the presence of other chiral molecules or objects. 
Therefore, two enantiomers fit differently into the enzymes that drive bio-
chemistry. Although enantiomers are thermodynamically identical, equally 
stable, and have the same spectra, one still would be inclined to say that they 
are two distinct species as well as two distinct substances (because some can 
be separated by hand, as Pasteur did).57 Because optical isomers have no in-
trinsic difference in their shapes, they present a problem in the philosophy of 
space.58  
 ArCl2 van der Waals complexes and ArCl
+ polyatomic ions may (or may 
not) meet the criteria of entity realism, but they cannot be put into bottles.59 
Also their identity conditions are evanescent. ArCl2 has an estimated lifetime 
of 10-12 seconds, but may properly be considered to exist (Earley 1998). Such 
rare species are identified in solution using spectroscopic techniques, perhaps 
supported by ab initio calculations. There is a large range of ‘fleeting species’ 
(Berson 2008) in between some classical substance which can be put into 
bottles, being more or less pure (such as water or benzene) on the one hand, 
and the knowledge that in a certain space-time region certain amounts of 
particular atoms hover round and interact to a greater or lesser extent (cf. 
Vemulapalli 2008, p. 41). 
 There is no all-encompassing chemical species concept that can encom-
pass their enormous variety, except for the very general notion of arrange-
ment of sets of nuclei and electrons.60 Hence a reductionist interpretation of 
materials in terms of something called ‘molecule’ (even if ions, etc. are includ-
ed) is not possible and one has to fall back on the level of nuclei and electrons 
as underlying basis. Nevertheless, as Bishop (2010, p. 171) puts it: “Molecular 
structure is a necessary condition for chemistry.” 
 Perhaps the ‘imposed’ terminological classification above can give an ink-
ling of the complexities of (chemical) stuff. No sharp distinctions are possi-
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ble. The old-fashioned idea of giving strict definitions in terms of necessary 
and sufficient conditions fails. The ordering of ‘stuff’ is better approached 
from the perspective of family resemblance concepts (having fuzzy borders 
and no ‘essence’).61 This is further supported by the remaining Sections of 
this paper. 
5. Chemical substance(s) – ‘stuff ’ 
Philosophical issues related to the notion of ‘chemical substances’ are a 
unique contribution to general philosophy of science and analytic metaphys-
ics. These issues are significantly different from discussions concerning natu-
ral kinds or categories in connection with other sciences (e.g. fundamental 
particles in theoretical physics, species in biology, alleged natural kinds in 
brain and behavioral sciences). By focusing on ‘stuff-kinds’ instead of ‘at-
oms’, we will see that the stuff of the world cannot be neatly divided by (al-
legedly) ‘cutting nature at its joints’. 
 The first issue is whether, ontologically speaking, the world consists fun-
damentally of one kind of matter or of a great variety of materials; i.e. the 
distinction between the ontology of matter in general and the ontology of 
particular kinds of matter (van Brakel 1991).62 Explicit statements concerning 
this distinction, often in connection with statements concerning atomism 
and/or the autonomy of chemistry, can be found in the writings of numerous 
chemists and philosophers in the past few centuries. Bachelard argued for 
metachemistry (“the prodigious variety of the changes [devenirs] of matter”), 
in contrast to metaphysics (which focuses on one substance only).63 In his 
later life Kant might have been developing a similar view. Already in the Dan-
tziger Physik of 1785 he wrote:64 
Chemistry has raised itself to greater perfection in recent times; it also right-
fully deserves the claim to the entire doctrine of nature: for only the fewest 
appearances of nature can be explained mathematically – only the smallest part 
of the occurrences of nature can be mathematically demonstrated. Thus, e.g., it 
can, to be sure, be explained according to mathematical propositions when 
snow falls to the earth; but why vapors transform into drops or are able to dis-
solve – here mathematics yields no elucidation, but this must be explained 
from universal empirical laws of chemistry.  
The consequences of the limits of a priori mathematical physics, of the rise of 
chemistry as a quantitative science, and of the need for a philosophical ac-
count of the variety of substances (which Kant started to see as a gap in his 
philosophy), Kant developed in his Opus posthumum (van Brakel 2006). 
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 Individualistic or atomistic metaphysics was ‘confirmed’ by the final suc-
cess of atomism around 1900.65 But already for a long time, European natural 
and formal languages presupposed an ontology of individuals. The ontology 
of chemistry might suggest an alternative view: to see the world as a mass of 
various materials (various kinds of stuff), which are in constant change due to 
interaction with their environment (i.e. other stuff).66 Properties and disposi-
tions should not be ascribed to individuals but to a mass of stuff.67 Perhaps 
the notion of affordances in the extended meaning of ‘to make available pos-
sibilities’, would suit the philosophy of chemistry better than the notion of 
individuals having (dispositional) properties.68 
 Stuff and individual are fundamentally different ontological categories 
(Schummer 1995, 2008; Lewowicz & Lombardi 2013). The history of West-
ern philosophy is biased towards viewing the world as a collection of individ-
uals. Individuals have primary qualities; substances have relational, extrinsic 
properties (depending irreducibly on context). All material properties are 
dynamic relations. An important difference to physics and standard concep-
tions of science is that substances can be placed in an experimental context 
independent of size, form, parts, or coordinates (Schummer 1998a, p. 132; cf. 
2008).69  
 In passing it may be noted that it has been argued that philosophers in 
ancient China should be interpreted as tacitly believing that the world should 
be analyzed, not only in terms of parts and whole(s), but in addition (or even 
primarily) by dividing down (from the whole to the parts), instead of analyz-
ing the world in terms of ‘atomic’ individuals and sets, i.e. building up.70 The 
one-many ‘entity’ assumption is typical for the history of Western philoso-
phy. Attributing a part-whole ‘stuff’ assumption to Mohist, Confucian, and 
Daoist thinking might give a better interpretation of their respective views 
concerning ‘the world’. One of the consequences would be that the Chinese 
character wu 物, usually translated as ‘object, thing’, should be translated as 
‘stuff-kind’. The world (universe) consists of a myriad of stuff-kinds (wanwu 
萬物), not of objects. 
 In addition to highlighting stuff-kinds, de-essentialization of the notion 
of chemical substance provides further support for de-reification. Although 
the precise meaning of ‘non-stoichiometric compounds’ (or berthollides) is 
contested,71 the omnipresence of non-stoichiometric compositional formula 
in various parts of inorganic chemistry (including metallurgy, ceramics, soil 
science, etc.) cannot be doubted, for example the composition of illite, 
K0.62Si3.51Al2.03Mg0.19Fe(III)0.29O10(OH)2 or reference to stable non-
stoichiometric phases in the system Sr1-xBi2+2x/3Ta2O9 (x=0-0.5).72 These two 
examples might be reinterpreted as complex solutions. Iron oxide under the 
name of wüstite is less disputable, having a stoichiometry of something like 
Fe0.86-0.94O and definitely behaving as a one-component system.73 Transition 
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metal oxides are not the only examples of deviations from stoichiometry.74 It 
may be a general feature of crystalline phases (Kosuge 1993).75 However, 
what superficially looks like a case of non-stoichiometry, may be a case of 
stoichiometrically ‘big numbers’ as they appear in homologous series of in-
termediate compounds such as Nb5O2.49 (which is Nb53O132) and clathrates or 
complexes such as Ar(H2O)5.67.76 
 It has been argued that the distinction between non-stoichiometric com-
pounds and solutions is one of convenience (Earley 2005). For example, in 
some situations titanium hydride is best considered a compound, in other 
situations a solution. Perhaps at low concentrations it may be considered a 
solution, whereas at higher concentrations, non-stoichiometric compound 
phases may form, all the way up to the ‘true compound’ TiH2. How should 
we draw the boundary between solutions and non-stoichiometric com-
pounds? Whatever the answer is, it is clear that pure stoichiometric substanc-
es fulfill an important role, but the range of ‘perfect’ materials is much broad-
er, no matter whether they are called solutions or non-stoichiometric com-
pounds. Quasi-homogeneous conglomerates (e.g. concrete) can also be ‘per-
fect’ materials.  
 Interest in non-stoichiometric compounds has been marginal in chemis-
try.77 With rare exceptions, research on non-stoichiometric substances only 
occurred in the margin of materials sciences. František Wald was one of few 
chemists, who, around 1900, committed himself to develop a theory of chem-
ical substances for the general case of non-stoichiometric substances, taking 
the notion of phase as fundamental.78 This view is certainly not without justi-
fication.79 Wald was right in stressing that stoichiometric substances are a 
special case, as the current increasing importance of so-called composites and 
the move from a pure-substance-discourse to a phase-discourse illustrates.80 
Many old and new composites do not claim to be (pure) substances. In de-
signing multicomponent high-entropy alloys (such as AlCoCrFeNiTix), one 
may prefer the formation of solid solution phases, i.e. mixtures, instead of 
(stoichiometric) intermetallic compound phases, i.e. (allegedly) pure sub-
stances.81 In fact, all substances are impure (cf. Bachelard) and sometimes the 
impurities make the relevant properties. Chemistry is an impure science 
(Bensaude-Vincent & Simon 2008). Traditional, modern, and hypermodern 
practices all aim at producing both pure and impure substances or mixtures, 
although there is a tendency for chemists to focus on pure substances or a 
couple of molecules,82 leaving the real stuff, whether pure or not, to materials 
science. 
 Often perfect materials were produced before anything was known con-
cerning their ontological status. For example, in the history of making hard 
steel, austenite, lederburite, and cementite were identified as different materi-
als with rather different characteristic properties, long before ‘theory’ told us 
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that lederburite is an eutectic mixture (solution) of the phases austenite (a 
saturated solid solution of the component C in the component Fe) and pure 
cementite (Fe3C), a stoichiometric compound.  
 A strict distinction between stoichiometric and non-stoichiometric ‘defi-
nite’ compounds (or compounds with variable composition such as TiO1.983-
2.000), as well as that between solutions and non-stoichiometric compounds, 
should not be insisted upon. Because, in the end, ‘(chemical) substance’ is a 
proto-scientific concept (not defined in science) and because identification 
(isolation, separation) depends on specific properties that are considered 
relevant and must be known, ‘substance’, no matter how defined in relation 
to solutions and non-stoichiometric compounds, will remain a pragmatic 
notion. Ambiguous situations may arise as to whether to count a sample as 
one, two, or three substances.83 In such cases, substance identity is best corre-
lated with its possible isolation, as distinct from components or ‘phase rule 
substances’ (identification via a phase diagram) and individuation of chemical 
species via interaction with electromagnetic radiation. Stimulated by the pro-
liferation of more and more polymorphisms of well-known (simple) sub-
stances and intermediate compounds in binary systems, as well as the prolif-
eration of new substances existing in one phase only or as metastable phases, 
there will be an increasing tendency to divide the material world into phases 
(of materials/species). 
 How to relate the categories of species, phases, and (pure) substances to 
the conceptual notion of element? The latter finds its empirical base in the 
periodic system and the existence of (simple) substances that cannot be sepa-
rated into other substances, except under the most extreme conditions. There 
seems to be consensus concerning Paneth’s (1931) proposal to distinguish 
basic and simple substances.84 The Grundstoff or basic substance (or element) 
is “the indestructible stuff present in compounds and simple substances”; the 
einfacher Stoff or simple substance is “that form of occurrence in which an iso-
lated basic substance uncombined with any other appears to our senses” (p. 129-
30, emphasis original).85 The latter is a chemical substance like others, except 
that it cannot be decomposed (further) by chemical means. The former pro-
vides the basis for the systematic ordering of the elements in the periodic 
system.86 Basic substances are the (unobservable) ultimate constituents of 
matter, whereas “the concept of basic substance as such does not in itself 
contain any idea of atomism”, as Lavoisier acknowledged (Paneth 1931, p. 
133). A similar distinction can be made for pure substances (a conceptual 
notion) and their approximate preparations in the laboratory or the chemical 
industry. However, it is less clear how this distinction would work for other 
materials, such as non-stoichiometric substances (unless the latter are cate-
gorically stipulated to be substances ‘with defects’). Paneth, following Kant 
(Ruthenberg 2010), speaks of the basic substance being transcendental. 
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Ruthenberg (2009, p. 89) rephrases this as: “Basic substances are non-
observables and rather concepts than concrete objects. They are not bearers 
of properties.” Hendry (2012a), Scerri (2009), and others will say that the 
atomic number (read: charge of nucleus) is a ‘real property’ of basic sub-
stances.87 
 According to Paneth, a simple substance may occur in different forms 
(isotopes, allotropes).88 To some this is counterintuitive. If we use the phase 
diagram as criterion (classical phase transitions, critical point) than isotopes 
are different substances. Properties of hydrogen and deuterium, such as triple 
point, are not the same.89 The situation for allotropes (as distinct from iso-
topes) is less clear. Allotropes are different forms of the same basic or simple 
substance. Today there is a zoo of different kinds of allotropes for elements 
such as carbon and sulphur. Usually allotropes are different phases, but dif-
ferent allotropes may be different species in the same phase (for example S2 
and S3 in the gas phase). Sulphur also has many named forms that are mix-
tures of ‘pure’ allotropes.90  
 The appearance of carbon has different complexities. There are numerous 
fullerenes.91 Although fullerenes are considered allotropes of carbon, dia-
grams for ‘traditional’ carbon and fullerene phase diagrams are studied in 
unrelated ways. Both contain allotropes connected by first order phase tran-
sitions at high pressures. Each fullerene behaves differently in column chro-
matography. The method of preparing ‘pure’ C60 is not fundamentally differ-
ent from preparing ordinary ‘pure’ substances. The conversion of C2 into C60 
and back looks more like a chemical transformation (changing chemical 
bonds) than a phase transition.92 On the other hand, fullerenes have been 
converted to diamond by applying solely high pressures.  
 The different forms of sulphur and carbon may be classified in terms of 
species and phases, but considering them as allotropes is problematic. There 
is also such a thing as ‘chemically induced phase transition’. Such cases un-
dermine a strict distinction between chemical transformations and physico-
chemical phase transitions. 
 Ozone is considered an allotrope of the chemical element O. However, 
the transformation of oxygen into ozone and vice versa is considered a 
‘chemical equilibrium’, not a phase transition. Oxygen and ozone each have 
their own allotropes and molecular species.93 Each survives its ‘own’ phase 
transitions while preserving its individuality. 
 Again we see that the variety of substances is enormous. The notion of 
‘simple substance’ seems simple, but the variety of isotopes, allotropes, and 
other forms of simple substances leads to many unsatisfactory conventional 
definitions, as the above examples of S, C, and O show. There are many dif-
ferent ways of ‘elements/atoms’ binding with itself (e.g. O3, S3, C60,) and the 
elements themselves turn out to be mixtures of various isotopes (e.g. D and 
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H). And there is more: ions, (free) radicals,94 and more esoteric phases and 
species. We have to accept that the variety of chemical substances cannot be 
fit into a streamlined classification system, whereas the variety is only in-
creasing as the world is extended to more esoteric boundary conditions (ex-
treme pressures and temperatures). 
6. Making new things 
In modern Chinese the word for chemistry is huaxue 化学, literal translation: 
‘science of material change’.95 This fits chemistry in the broad sense very well. 
The most unique kind of transformation, sometimes considered the defining 
characteristic of chemistry, is synthesis. Synthesis is central to organic, pol-
ymer, inorganic, organometallic, and solid state chemistry and is usually asso-
ciated with chemical reactions taking place. However, preparing heavy water 
(D2O), or Helium-4 and Helium-3 isotopes, is also the result of transfor-
mation of substances, although no chemical reactions occur.96 Synthesis is 
typically followed by purification or concentration (van Brakel 2012c), which 
also requires further transformations, not involving chemical reactions. 
 Synthetic chemistry is a unique science in that it produces the objects it 
investigates.97 Unlike other branches of science, the scientific products of 
synthetic chemistry are not merely ideas, but substances that change the 
material world, for the benefit or harm of living beings. “Rather than depict-
ing the world as it is, chemistry develops an understanding of the world by 
changing the world” (Schummer 2010, p. 177). Chemistry, apart from being 
descriptive like other sciences, is also productive, but not in the same way as 
most of technology (as I already argued in Section 3). But it has also been 
suggested that new chemical substances or species are theoretical entities, 
because they are postulated by a theory (of molecular structure). 
 The discourse of chemical synthesis is primarily one of chemical species. 
However, most of the time the result of species transformation is of little use 
if the new products cannot be isolated and concentrated as pure substances 
by separation methods (as in pharmaceutical technology).98  
 Because the changes are radical in that they create new stuff, synthesis 
increases the complexity of the world. Because further synthesis has no lim-
its, chemical knowledge is fundamentally incomplete or “unfathomable” in a 
way not true of other sciences. The synthesis of new substances increases the 
scope of possible knowledge (the number of undetermined properties) much 
faster than the scope of actual knowledge (the number of known proper-
ties).99  
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 Traditional philosophers usually claim priority for entities, things, or 
substances and consider changes secondary attributes. In chemistry change is 
essential rather than secondary.100 It is essential, because through chemical 
reactions all substance properties change. Multiple processes are taking place 
on different time scales. In the natural world there are no fixed and isolated 
chemical substances, but only permanent chemical change of matter. Chemi-
cal species are undergoing continuous (reversible or irreversible) transfor-
mations. Interatomic distances and angles are dynamic entities. This suggests 
that process philosophy might be more suitable for the philosophy of chem-
istry (Stein 2004, Earley 2013).101 Process philosophy considers entities only 
as temporary states. Process philosophies focus on continuing, ever-present 
change. Process philosophy also fits a stuff perspective better.102 
 The phrase ‘chemical space’ has not been clearly defined, but its intended 
meaning is straightforward. It is used in contrast to space-time and ‘contains’ 
substances/species and their relations (i.e. all possible chemical changes). 
Seen as a (nonlinear) network, chemical space in the narrow sense consists 
primarily of ‘classical’ pure stoichiometric substances at the nodes; the rela-
tionships between the nodes are chemical reactions correlated to experi-
mental practice (including reactions with as yet non-existing substances).103 
 Thus (pure) substance identity is dependent on its relations to other sub-
stances (Bernal & Daza 2010). Phases, species, and substances can be corre-
lated to one another in some places in chemical/material space. Species and 
substance interaction is the most noteworthy feature of the relational struc-
ture of chemical space, but material space should also include the relational 
structure of (pure) phases and their transitions. Synthesis and phase theory 
can provide data for the construction of material space, which ideally should 
include: 
(1) pure (simple and compound) substances and corresponding phase dia-
grams, allotropes and polymorphs, as well as the many corresponding 
species (many of which are not known); 
(2) non-stoichiometric compounds and solutions of pure substances, as 
well as the corresponding phase diagrams and species not included 
above; 
(3) species not contained in the above, which may only exist in solution 
with extremely low concentration and/or having a brief lifetime; 
(4) any remaining phases; 
(5) all transformational relations between substances/species/phases men-
tioned above. 
Material space is restricted to homogeneous materials. Inhomogeneous mate-
rials can be characterized in terms of their constituting phases. Because there 
are three basic categories (phases, substances, species), there will be many 
fuzzy boundaries and pragmatic choices in the construction of material space. 
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For example, each of the following has to be fitted into the space of pure 
substances,104 species, and phase diagrams: polymorphs, allotropes, polymers, 
isotopes, enantiomers, racemates, tautomers, inclusion complexes, addition 
compounds, and more.105 Much work needs to be done to provide a more 
precise and detailed account of the structure of material space. 
 Chemical or material space requires sophisticated semiotics to name its 
contents.106 The semiotics of classification is not unique to chemistry. How-
ever, given the huge size of chemical space, one may argue that here we have a 
case of ‘transformation of quantity into quality’. Chemistry can certainly 
claim the importance of classificatory concepts as a respectable notion in the 
philosophy of science. It may be noted that the ‘rational’ classification of the 
millions of organic substances is impressive, but there are many other classi-
ficatory issues in chemistry. In inorganic chemistry and materials science, 
there are many irresolvable vague boundaries.107 The impossibility of devising 
a strictly ‘rational’ ordering is already illustrated by the unending list of pro-
posals for alternative representations of the Periodic System.108 
 Criteria to identify and divide natural kinds include similarities variously 
defined (such as similar appearance, projectable predicates, microstructurally 
defined ‘essences’) and also origin (causal-historical criteria), but it is not 
obvious that such criteria will distinguish natural from other kinds (van 
Brakel 1992a). What is certain about (pure) chemical substances is that they 
are not natural. Simple substances and compounds fail any natural kinds test 
(isotopes, allotropes, polymorphs, etc.).109 Chemistry does not support essen-
tialist realism as already noted in Section 3. Whether we focus on macro- or 
micro-description, the alleged essences vary with circumstances (van Brakel 
1986). 
 The fact that chemistry is in the business of making new stuff requires a 
major change or elimination of philosophical theories of natural kinds. With 
respect to chemical substances there is no principled difference between nat-
ural and artificial kinds (Bhushan 2006). There is no scientific way to distin-
guish between natural and artificial substances, in contrast to artifacts in 
technologies.110 In chemical technology it makes no difference whether the 
incoming substances are natural or artificial.111 All stuff originates in the natu-
ral world. There is no creation ex nihilo. But in principle every (stable or met-
astable) phase, substance, and species can occur in nature as well as being 
made by chemists.112 Somebody might say that chemistry loses the status of 
science if it has no natural kinds. But a better view is that the notion of natu-
ral kind is outdated (also with respect to other sciences). 
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7. Interdiscourse relations chemistry – physics  
By now there is a wide range of studies concerning the various difficulties of 
relating molecular structure to quantum mechanics. Different authors pre-
sent their views differently, but almost all agree that ‘chemistry’ cannot be 
‘reduced’ to quantum mechanics. Here is a selection of remarks, often re-
peated by many authors.113 Many chemical concepts, in the first place chemi-
cal bond and congeners, are not amenable to quantum mechanical treatment. 
Covalent and ionic bonds cannot be separated in exclusive concepts. Hybrid 
orbital representation does not fit into quantum mechanics. Quantum chem-
istry is incapable of dealing with a range of molecules in terms of one theory. 
Selection of trial wave functions is a critical hurdle for quantum treatments of 
molecules (Woody 2012, p. 431). The existence of isomers and in particular 
chirality is not to be found in quantum mechanics (Bishop 2005, 2010). Ac-
cording to quantum mechanics molecules do not have a shape (Ramsey 
2000). Exact Coulombic Schrödinger equations should be spherically sym-
metrical, but polyatomic molecules cannot be spherically symmetrical (Hen-
dry 2010a). Electronic configurations for atoms and molecules, the aufbau, 
Hund, and Pauli principles have not been deduced from quantum mechanics 
(Scerri 2007b, p. 74). The length of periods in the Periodic Table cannot be 
derived from quantum mechanics.114  
 Quantum chemistry “cannot even compete with chemical structure theo-
ry” (Schummer 2010, p. 171).115 Molecular structure is imposed rather than 
explained. The widely used Born-Oppenheimer approximation presupposes a 
rigid nuclear structure for molecules; the molecular back-bone central to 
classical chemical structure theory is put in by hand. And perhaps more fun-
damentally: The notion of molecular structure conflicts with Heisenberg’s 
uncertainty relation. Electrons are assumed to move quantum-mechanically, 
but not the nuclei. Indistinguishability of identical nuclei do not provide a 
basis for a quantum theory of chemistry (Sutcliffe & Woolley 2012b, p. 422). 
The whole, its parts, and its environment [form] a high-relational network 
(Llored 2012, p. 271). If two particles are ‘entangled’, the quantum state of 
each particle cannot be described independently. 
 Bogaard (1978) already made most of these observations in a paper pre-
sented at the 1978 meeting of the American Philosophy of Science Association. 
The most detailed philosophical defense of a form of reduction of chemistry 
to physics by a philosopher, based on Nagel’s views, is Hettema (2012a),116 
but he also says: 
The original aim of deriving chemistry from physics without any auxiliary or 
ad hoc assumptions has not been fulfilled. [Hettema 2013, p. 338] 
The transition state as a unique sort of molecule, explicitly adds insights from 
the reduced theory to the reducing theory. [Hettema 2012b, p. 25] 
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The system is assumed to be isolated from its environment in the sense that 
the environment can be treated classically. [Hettema 2009, p. 151] 
The explanation of chemistry by physical theory has many complications, and 
the physical foundations of chemistry are found in a multitude of physical 
theories, patched together with assumptions, approximations and special ap-
plications. [Hettema 2012a, p. 2] 
Nagel’s ‘heterogeneous reduction’ is not much different from non-reductive 
stances.117 
 Of course, one cannot prove that reduction is impossible, but I do not 
know of any proposals to derive molecular structure (and explanations based 
on it) from quantum mechanics without making fundamental presuppositions 
and/or approximations that are external to the discourse of quantum me-
chanics. For example, the well-known work of Bader, placing chemistry 
squarely in the realm of physics, is based on the presupposition of a “return 
to Dalton’s notion of an atom as a bounded space-filling object”, which pos-
tulate is not part of quantum mechanics (Bader & Matta 2013, p. 256; original 
in italics).118  
 Historically, chemistry and physics kept their disciplinary focus, notwith-
standing many interdisciplinary exchanges. The importance of quantum me-
chanics for chemistry is not disputed. An increasing number of facts can be 
explained and/or predicted by applying quantum mechanics to a given molec-
ular structure. It is not denied that methodological reductionism is a fruitful 
research program in the natural sciences and perhaps elsewhere.119 However, 
typically the reduction of chemistry to physics is presupposed and on this 
basis the notion of reduction is adapted and made flexible so as to comply 
with the postulate. Writers in the philosophy of science often take for grant-
ed that there must be reduction. Confronted with the complexity of the rela-
tion of physics and chemistry in quantum chemistry, they modify the defini-
tion of reduction (Lombardi 2013). 
 Surely, physical laws posit restrictions on what can happen in the world, 
including the chemical world, but leave open many possibilities.120 Chemical 
behavior cannot violate the boundaries set by the fundamental laws of quan-
tum mechanics (and relativity theory); the latter provide an a priori space of 
possibilities for chemistry. But which possibilities are actual cannot be de-
rived from quantum mechanics (if only because of the contributions of 
boundary conditions to actualities).  
 Unfortunately, there is quite some repetition in the ‘anti-reductionist’ 
literature in the philosophy of chemistry and not all writers understand eve-
rything they borrow from earlier sources. Woolley (1978) has been cited over 
and over again, although sometimes his view is not well understood and some 
authors do not seem to know of more recent publications of the same author 
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(and Sutcliffe). It may be useful to cite Sutcliffe and Woolley at some length 
to bring out their nuanced view.121 
[The] qualitative modification of the internal Hamiltonian, the extra choice of 
fixed nuclear positions in the ‘electronic’ Hamiltonian, is ad hoc […]. An es-
sential feature of the answer is put in by hand. [Sutcliffe & Woolley 2013, p. 
33] 
In our view it is not at all evident that the Coulombic Hamiltonian on its own 
will give rise to the chemically interesting features. […] In other words one 
should not expect useful contact between the quantum theory of an isolated 
molecule (which is what the eigenstates of the Coulombic Hamiltonian refer 
to) and a quantum account of individual molecules, as met in ordinary chemi-
cal situations. [Sutcliffe & Woolley 2012a] 
That said, the conventional account, treating formally identical nuclei as iden-
tifiable particles when it seems chemically prudent to do so, has enabled a co-
herent and progressive account of much chemical experience to be provided. 
But it is not derived by continuous approximations from the eigensolutions of 
the Schrödinger equation for the molecular Coulomb Hamiltonian, requiring 
as it does an essential empirical input. [Sutcliffe & Woolley 2012a] 
We have never claimed that molecular structure cannot be reconciled with or 
reduced to quantum mechanics, or that there is something ‘alien’ about it; our 
claim is much more modest. We do not know how to make the connection; 
our hunch is that no-one else does either. [Sutcliffe & Woolley 2011] 
They conclude that it is “plainly ludicrous” (Sutcliffe & Woolley 2012b, p. 
422) to claim either that quantum mechanics or the idea of molecular struc-
ture is wrong. Instead “some new idea is required” (ibid., p. 423). Of course 
they are thinking of a new idea in chemical physics, but new ideas are equally 
needed on the philosophical side. 
 Note that Sutcliffe and Woolley leave open the possibility that some day 
molecular structure might be derived from pure quantum mechanics. Al-
ready, ‘Beyond the Born-Oppenheimer Approximation’ methods have been 
proposed, for example by Tapia (2006), who points out that the conclusions 
of Sutcliffe and Woolley are based on the Coulomb Hamiltonian and claims 
that in his approach the problems Woolley and Sutcliffe raise do not arise. 
Whether approaches not taking the Coulombic Hamiltonian as its starting 
point can avoid adding ad hoc assumptions, remains to be seen.122 
 In passing it may be noted that already in physics there is emergence and 
context-generated ontology all over the place. Physics cannot be reduced to 
physics (the ‘zeroth step’): 
• failure of strict reduction in particle physics;123 
• reduction of classical physics to quantum physics is problematic;124 
• thermodynamics cannot be reduced to statistical mechanics.125 
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When mentioning extra assumptions required to make quantum mechanics 
applicable to chemical systems, it is important to distinguish assumptions 
that find their home in classical physics (e.g. collision theory) or classical 
chemistry (e.g. molecular structure). Although it seems certain that quantum 
chemistry cannot be reduced to quantum physics as it exists today, this is less 
obvious if classical physics is added to quantum mechanics (Bishop 2010, p. 
171). Classical physics provides notions of space, shape, mechanics, and 
thermodynamic parameters. Also Hettema (2009, 2012a) suggests that chem-
istry can be reduced to quantum cum classical physics. 
 Most discussions on interdiscourse relations (such as reduction, super-
venience, emergence) situate themselves in the philosophy of mind (focusing 
on the relation between mental and physical or neurophysiological predi-
cates), followed by the philosophy of biology (genotype and phenotype, 
distant and proximate causes) and philosophy of social science (individuals 
and the regularities in economics and social science).126 Philosophy of chemis-
try cannot merely contribute interesting case studies, but the relation of 
chemistry with physics (and on the other hand biology) is unique in the 
sense that if reduction of chemistry to physics fails (or reduction of biology 
to chemistry), this undermines all reductive forms of physicalism or natural-
ism in whatever domain in one fell swoop.127 The relation between chemistry 
and physics is the crucial step for claiming a hierarchy of sciences or any oth-
er general type of interscience relation.128 In addition, the relations between 
chemistry and physics provide the most detailed and concrete case studies 
that would have to fit any proposed form of reductive or non-reductive rela-
tions between sciences.129 
 Of course, to speak of ‘the relation between chemistry and physics’ is 
nonsense (van Brakel 2003, table 1): a whole variety of possible intertheoreti-
cal relations have to be addressed.130 There is no a priori reason why the na-
ture of the interdiscourse relation (covariance, dependency, accommodation, 
reduction, emergence, supervenience, mereological relationships, theoretical 
identities, intertheoretic approximation, explanatory unification, what have 
you) is the same for: 
• the relations between molecular structure and quantum-mechanical 
systems of charged particles;  
• the relations between macroscopic substances and their constituent 
microspecies;131  
• the relations between vernacular and scientific use of substance 
names;132 
• the relations between (chemical) thermodynamics, irreversible ther-
modynamics, statistical mechanics, and quantum mechanics.133 
The more specific relations in each of these groups may display different 
interdiscourse relations as well. 
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 As an alternative to a hierarchy of levels connected by reduction or emer-
gence (or supervenience) relations, I propose a form of event monism, which 
allows a greater variety of interdiscourse relations (including blending or 
amalgamation – see below). Different disciplines and theories at different 
levels in these disciplines can be thought of as describing events (including 
situations, states, processes). Events are pre-theoretic manifest taken for 
granted entities.134 Objects are theoretical notions. Different disci-
plines/theories may claim to describe what, colloquially speaking, is the same 
event;135 for example the event of boiling water or an event involving particu-
lar chiral molecules. Because identification conditions of events are dis-
course-dependent, different discourses are strictly speaking not describing 
the same events, in particular if these discourses focus on different ‘levels’ (cf. 
Ramsey 1997, p. 237). This kind of incommensurability need not bother us. 
There is no need for the assumption that the chemical world coincides in an 
ontologically strict sense with the physical world. A chemical electron may 
be different from a physical electron. The manifest ‘this, here’ (including 
sophisticated instrumentation) connects the different discourses, confirmed 
by the predictive success of the joint effort of discourses and whatever inter-
discourse relations prevail. The latter provide the heterogeneous basis for the 
unification of science.136 
 In the philosophy of mind and elsewhere, when multiple realization caus-
es trouble for hoped for reductive relationships, one most often resorts to 
one of the many asymmetrical supervenience definitions. But this approach 
does not work in the philosophy of chemistry. If a sample is a species of 
water, it must be a cluster of H2O species, and if it is a cluster of H2O species 
it must be a species of water (where the cluster and species are specified as far 
as current knowledge allows). This would be a symmetrical supervenience (or 
covariance) relation. On the other hand, the relation between molecular 
structure and charged particles described quantum mechanically, is multireal-
izable in the wrong direction.137 As it happens, philosophers of chemistry 
discussing supervenience always give examples of the relation between mac-
roscopic features such as ‘being water’ or ‘smell’ and molecular structure.138 
Supervenience is rarely mentioned as applicable to chemistry and quantum 
mechanics (but emergence and downward causation is).139  
 Philosophy of chemistry can highlight the need for investigating symmet-
rical interdiscourse relations and reverse multiple realization. Woody (2012) 
made the important suggestion that quantum chemistry amalgamates con-
cepts from quantum mechanics and molecular structure theory (and other 
physical and chemical concepts).140 Woody writes (2012, p. 459): 
Underneath the diagrammatic and graphical representations themselves rest 
amalgamated theoretical concepts developed through a complicated grafting of 
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quantum theory, classical structure theory in chemistry, and particular math-
ematical approximation techniques.  
A major example of an amalgamated concept is an orbital diagram, a genuine-
ly hybrid representation, neither straightforwardly qualitative nor quantita-
tive, but vital for chemical reasoning. The notion of an orbital derives from 
quantum mechanics, but in its sophisticated diagrammatic forms has ab-
sorbed much of classical chemistry.  
 The intuition that we should not always think of reductive or emergence 
relations between two discourses, but of ‘fusing’ or ‘blending’ of different 
discourses is apparent from a range of terminology used by different authors. 
Harré (2006, p. 509) speaks of complementary descriptions; as did Primas 
before him: A full account requires the simultaneous articulation of comple-
mentary modes of description, interconnected by dialectical thinking (Primas 
1983, pp. 355, 326). Others speak of the combination of classical molecular 
structure with the quantum properties of the electron.141 Hettema refers to 
quantum chemistry as “in between” physics and chemistry, involving “a lot of 
theoretical and ontological ‘borrowing’” (2002a, pp. xvii-xviii). 
 The amalgamation of concepts is not unique to chemistry. It is wide-
spread in the sciences and its importance is underestimated by purely philo-
sophical discussions of a few interdiscourse relations.142 Also here philosophy 
of chemistry could play a central role because of the abundant detail available.  
 Perhaps the amalgamation model should be applied to the relation of the 
macroscopic and the microstructural as well. In practice these discourses are 
intimately mixed.143 For example, the polywater episode shows how descrip-
tions at different levels are all assumed to describe the same pre-theoretical 
events and between them resolve the paradoxical observations and specula-
tions (van Brakel 1993). This may well apply to all cases of interdiscourse 
relations broadly conceived.  
 The physical and chemical world, themselves patchworks of the many 
worlds scientists are making,144 are connected by a range of interdiscourse 
relations, not necessarily all of the same type.145 Symmetrical interdiscourse 
relations, reverse multiple realization, and amalgamation of concepts are cen-
tral issues for how everything fits together and requires a form of event mon-
ism, to which philosophy of chemistry can make important contributions. 
 Finally, in connection with quantum mechanics it should be noted that 
there is only (approximate) global supervenience of the special sciences on 
the physical (and of parts of physics on other parts of physics). A consistent 
description of any phenomenon in quantum terms must strictly speaking 
include the entire universe. This might offer support for global superveni-
ence, but it leaves no room for local (or ‘weak’) supervenience.146 Quine 
(1978) writes:  
 Philosophy of Science and Philosophy of Chemistry 37 
 
Nothing happens in the world, not the flutter of an eyelid, not the flicker of a 
thought, without some redistribution of microphysical states. It is usually 
hopeless and pointless to determine just what ones supervened in the event, 
but some reshuffling at that level there had to be; physics can settle for no 
less. 
This is correct, but characterizes global supervenience, not supervenience as 
usually discussed. 
8. Conclusion 
Philosophy of chemistry should annex (large parts of) physical chemistry, 
chemical physics, materials science, geology, and molecular biology. 
 As elaborated in Section 2, the era of the neglect of chemistry in the phi-
losophy of science is not yet over. It will take some time before substantial 
articles in philosophy of chemistry will be routinely included in overviews of 
general philosophy of science. The publication of articles in the journal Phi-
losophy of Science and other mainstream journals in analytic philosophy, as 
well as Elsevier’s Handbook Philosophy of Chemistry, is a good step forward, 
and philosophy of chemistry can take advantage of the current concern to 
include several/many sciences in overviews.  
 It has been suggested in several places that the philosophy of chemistry 
has reached its mature stage. There is little doubt that philosophy of chemis-
try as an autonomous discipline with two international journals is there to 
stay, but it has not yet reached what one might call a ‘critical mass’. A critical 
mass is reached when there are a few chairs/institutes ‘institutionally’ dedi-
cated to philosophy of chemistry.147 Only then will there be sufficient space 
for Ph.D.’s in philosophy of chemistry to continue their research career in 
philosophy of chemistry. The existence of philosophy of chemistry still de-
pends very much on contingent factors such as the interests and academic 
career of particular individuals. 
 Many subjects in the philosophy of chemistry require a revision of the 
dominant views on major themes in the philosophy of science and support 
what are presently marginal positions in the philosophy of science, for exam-
ple van Fraassen’s proposal for a pragmatic notion of explanation, or Cart-
wright’s dappled world and ceteris paribus laws. The latter examples suggest 
empiricism. At the same time, the constructive side of chemistry (making 
new stuff) provides strong pragmatic support for a realist position. Hence 
one might speak of a form of constructive realism (which is not much differ-
ent from van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism) being supported by philos-
ophy of chemistry. 
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 If chemistry were the ‘first science’ in philosophy of science, this would 
involve the following major changes in the philosophy of science (and spin-
off in analytic metaphysics, including the philosophy of mind). 
(1) Focus on explaining the great variety of materials and their relations, 
instead of focus on reduction of everything to the one underlying mat-
ter of atoms or fundamental particles. 
(2) Focus on change (synthesis, transformations, transitions) instead of 
description of the world ‘as it is’.  
(3) Focus on the details of the relations between chemistry and physics 
may teach us more about the ‘unity of science’ then imposing a hierar-
chical reductive structure. 
(4) Philosophy of chemistry may provide important contributions to the 
question, ‘How does everything fit together in the world(s)?’ For ex-
ample, by developing a form of event monism and investigating sym-
metrical supervenience relations, reverse multiple realization, and the 
‘emergence’ of amalgamated concepts. 
(5) A completely new theory of kinds is required, dropping the alleged 
distinction between natural and artificial kinds.  
Notes
 
1 Categories are not (natural) kinds; they come before any classification. According 
to Bachelard the notion of (chemical) substance “operates effectively as a catego-
ry” (1940, p. 44). Categories provide a meta-conceptual scheme providing the 
basic structure of the world (as in Aristotle’s and Kant’s categories). It is not easy 
to envisage discussing alternative categorical schemes (Derrida 1982). 
2 In contrast chemical physics is usually considered part of physics. 
3 Production of materials that do not involve chemical transformations or physico-
chemical phase transitions are not included, for example metamaterials. Metamate-
rials are artificial materials engineered to have properties that may not be found in 
nature. 
4 I am indebted to the many publications of Joachim Schummer. These publications 
present the first and most comprehensive philosophical analysis today of the na-
ture of chemistry. See, in particular, Schummer 1995, 1996, 1997a, 1997b, 1998a, 
1998b, 2001, 2003a, 2003b, 2006a, 2006b, 2008, 2010. 
5 A substantial part of this Section is taken from van Brakel 2012a, pp. 39-42. 
6 Immanuel Kant went so far as to suggest that chemistry can serve as an analogy, 
metaphor, or paradigm for the method of critical philosophy. Cf. Lequan 2000, 
pp. 5, 105-7 and citations from Kant in note 33 of van Brakel 2006, p. 84. 
7 See for references van Brakel 2000, p. 138. These proceedings may be considered 
an inventory of issues in philosophy of chemistry already dormant among chem-
ists and philosophers before the 1990s. 
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8 The more recent Philosophies of the Sciences (Alhoff 2010) contains Schummer 
2010. 
9 Although the chemical revolution (from phlogiston to oxygen) has been heralded 
as Kuhn’s primary motivation for his views on the structure of scientific revolu-
tions, in the past decade critical voices have suggested that Kuhn’s general theory 
of scientific revolutions does not fit the particular case of the chemical revolution 
very well (Blumenthal 2013). 
10 Cf. Klein (2012), who argues that modern chemists’ interest in pure chemical 
substances does not presuppose a concept of pure science. 
11 Important concepts that warrant analysis include: chemical bonding, orbital, hy-
bridization, functional group, electronegativity, substituent effect, configuration, 
resonance, aromaticity, chirality, acidity, transition state, phase transition point, 
phase (rule), to name but a few. 
12 Not surprisingly the mostly discussed concept is chemical bonding, but, as yet, 
there is little synergy. See, recently, Hendry 2008a, 2012b, Needham 2014, Vemu-
lapalli 2006, Weisberg 2008, Woody 2000, 2012. The assumption of a bond be-
tween only two atoms is obviously wrong, but rarely addressed (I owe this obser-
vation to the late Krishna Vemulapalli). 
13 Mulder (2010) has argued that orbitals are states, not entities. 
14 Adjectives used to modify scientific realism in the philosophy of chemistry in-
clude: structural, strategical, operational, constructive, pragmatic. Bensaude-
Vincent (2008) has shown that the realism/positivism dichotomy in the philoso-
phy of science overlooks the making stuff feature of chemistry. 
15 Kripke also claimed there to be the existence of contingent and a priori state-
ments, for example the definition of the ‘standard metre in Paris’. For discussion 
and critique see van Brakel 1990. 
16 These later publications include: Needham 2000, 2002, 2008ab, 2011, 2014, 
Ruthenberg 2012, van Brakel 1997, 2005, VandeWall 2007, Weisberg 2006. Per-
haps the message still needs repeating in order to educate philosophers. 
17 The problem of bridging connections between systems across widely separated 
scales is well-known from the philosophy of physics. Modeling shape does not 
only play a role in the ‘reduction’ of molecular structure, but also in modeling ge-
ometrical boundary conditions in chemical engineering (van Brakel 2012c, pp. 
541-2). 
18 For example, according to Bensaude-Vincent et al. (2011, p. 375), the periodic 
system is “the inscription of the basic building blocks that are used by nature and 
simultaneously the revelation of a unique and general law governing the irreduci-
ble diversity of chemical phenomena”. 
19 A characteristic of chemistry is the use of non-numerical and discrete mathemat-
ics. See Balaban 2005 and the special issues of Hyle on ‘Chemistry and Mathemat-
ic’ (2012, no. 1; 2013, no. 1). 
20 Christie & Christie 2000, van Brakel 2000, ch. 6; cf. Vihalemm 2005, Harré 2012. 
21 One might suggest that chemists use “the detour of the laboratory to access na-
ture” (Bensaude-Vincent 2009, p. 168). 
22 Hunger 2006, van Brakel 2000, chs. 6-7; Weisberg 2004, 2012. 
23 See van Brakel 2012c. Vessels, columns, tubes, and other containers have been 
made to narrow specifications; hence phenomenological equations can be applied 
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under relatively simple boundary conditions. Although the internal geometry of a 
unit operation can be highly complex, approximate ‘ab initio’ calculation may still 
be a possibility. However, one cannot avoid multiphase heterogeneous systems in 
almost any unit operation or sophisticated chemical reactor, and then the geome-
try of the phase boundaries quickly becomes intractable, in particular if more than 
two phases are involved. In the chemical industry fitting a model is a matter of 
mutual attunement of model and ‘made reality’. 
24 See Earley 2006, 2008, Harré & Llored 2011, 2013, Llored 2012, Needham 2010a, 
Sukumar 2013. 
25 Ethyl alcohol (CH3CH2OH) has five hydrogen centres. Those hydrogen atoms 
are not all the same. 
26 Earley (2006) has discussed the features of ‘chemical coherences’ (dissipative 
structures, self-organizing collections, open systems) and considers them chemi-
cal ‘substances’, but not ‘chemical substances’. 
27 See Goodwin 2009b, 2010, Woody 2004, 2012. The role of diagrammatic represen-
tation does not easily fit into standard accounts of the relation between two theo-
ries or disciplines and the relation of physics and chemistry in particular (Woody 
2000, 2004).  
28 The role of structural formulae supports Goodman’s (1978) arguments to consid-
er truth a subsidiary of rightness. Goodman will say that a diagrammatic represen-
tation can be right but not true. For Goodman rightness is a matter of fitting and 
working. See Goodman & Elgin 1988, pp. 155-6. 
29 Including causal explanations based on interventions (Llored 2012, p. 271; Ramsey 
2008). 
30 Personally I think that theoretical reasoning can only exist within models or for-
mal languages. If this reasoning is to be connected to events in ‘the world’ it will 
always require ‘approximate’ reasoning. 
31 Much earlier Heidegger had already argued that the essence of even theoretical 
physics is that of the technological attitude of representing and controlling (Ma 
and van Brakel 2014). 
32 Chamizo (2013, p. 167) introduced the term technochemistry for “the activities 
derived from the chemical experiment”. Klein (2005) has argued that since the 
seventeenth-century, chemistry has been a technoscience avant la lettre. On behalf 
of Latour-type constructivism Nordmann (2006) has suggested that a substance 
should be conceived as a “stable assemblage”. But this can be proposed with re-
spect to all scientific concepts.  
33 Hoffmann 2003, Laszlo 2003, Schummer 2003b, Weibel & Fruk 2013. 
34 Substantial parts of this Section are drawn from van Brakel 2012b. 
35 The notion of phase should be distinguished from the notion of state of matter 
(or state of aggregation). Diamond and graphite are the same state of matter (sol-
id) but different phases of carbon. There are an indefinite number of phases and 
only a few, slowly rising, number of states of matter (solid, liquid, gas, plasma, 
Bose-Einstein condensate, strange matter, …). The more exotic states of matter 
do not occur on earth (not even in laboratories). The distinction between states of 
matter and phases is fuzzy. For example, mesomorphic phases (liquid crystals) 
and supercritical fluid phases have also been called different states of matter.  
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36 Conglomerates are inhomogeneous mixtures of different phases, for example 
smoke, concrete, or a mixture of water and ice. Conglomerates are a major focus 
in geology. 
37 However, at the micro- and nano-scale, phase properties may depend on surface 
tensions and at an even lower scale, the notion of phase becomes meaningless (like 
other thermodynamic parameters). 
38 Phase predicates should be distinguished from substance predicates (Needham 
2007, 2010a). 
39 Amorphous phases can exist in different modifications (polyamorphism). The 
transformation of amorphous into crystalline phases and vice versa can be reversi-
ble or irreversible. 
40 The region near a phase boundary is, strictly speaking, a separate phase. Meso-
morphic phases are anisotropic phases intermediate between solid and liquid; gela-
tine is a common example. Micelles and other aggregates involving surfactants 
may also be considered mesomorphic phases. Colloids (sol, gel, emulsion, foam) 
are sometimes considered homogenous solutions, but more commonly referred to 
as two phases (a particulate phase dispersed in a fluid phase). To characterize nat-
urally occurring petroleum fluids, eleven distinct phase transitions have been iden-
tified. The ‘phases’ of a block copolymer may display microphase segregation in 
addition to macrophase separation. 
41 See for the phase rule Needham 2012, pp. 281-5; van Brakel 2012b, pp. 201-5, 
Vemulapalli 2012, pp. 488-91.  
42 For a critical discussion concerning a possibly third criterion for being a pure 
substance, entropy of mixing, see Hendry 2010b. 
43 An example is the system BaO-TiO2. It contains intermediate compounds that 
exist in their own right (having specific applications). BaTi4O9 and Ba2Ti9O20 are 
useful materials in the context of microwave frequency communication. Other in-
termediate compounds in this system include: BaTi4O9, BaTi3O7, BaTi2O5, Ba-
TiO3 (two polymorphs), and Ba2TiO4. 
44 The label ‘compound’ is short for compound substance, which can be stoichio-
metric or non-stoichiometric. See on simple substances end of Section 5. 
45 Because one-phase materials miss the substance characteristic of occurring in 
more than one phase connected by classical phase transitions. 
46 There are other reversible and irreversible phase transitions. For example, there 
are magnetic transformations (of, say, α-ferrite to β-ferrite), which do not take 
place at a definite temperature. But it is disputable whether this should be called a 
phase transition. The crystal structures of α- and β-ferrite are the same and the lat-
ter may be considered merely a ‘form’ of the former. 
47 Sea water is a solution. Air is a solution. A mixed crystal is a (solid) solution. 
48 Separation methods are a neglected core of chemistry. The Dutch word for chem-
istry is scheikunde, literally meaning ‘knowledge and art of separation’. It has been 
argued that this is a method utterly different from other modes of analysis known 
in the empirical sciences (Klein 2008, p. 38). 
49 Cf. chemical space in Section 6. 
50 Cf. the views of Bachelard and Meyerson (van Brakel 2012a, pp. 31-3). Bachelard 
argued that true chemical substances are the product of technique, not materials 
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found in reality (1940, p. 45). Meyerson argued that a pure substance is an abstrac-
tion created by a theory. 
51 For an early, still relevant discussion of problematic cases see Timmermans 1963 
(1928) and further van Brakel 2012b. 
52 Allowing that the contents of the bottle will be stable only in a limited range of 
pressure and temperature. 
53 Crucially, the calibration of spectroscopic techniques may depend on the prepara-
tion of pure substances. Different spectroscopic techniques may suggest different 
structures of the same substance or species. 
54 For example, argonfluorhydride can be formed in a matrix of solid argon, but not 
separated from this environment. 
55 Excimers (occurring in lasers or plasmas) are molecules which represent a bound 
state of their constituents only in the excited state, but not in the electronic 
ground state; for example, the combination of an inert gas atom (Ar, Xe, Kr) and 
a halogen atom (F, Cl). 
56 Enantiomers or optical isomers are chiral molecules that are non-superimposable 
mirror images of each other. Chirality also occurs in inorganic systems, for exam-
ple [Co(NH3)5Cl]SO4 is racemic (i.e. having equal amounts of right-handed and 
left-handed enantiomers of a chiral molecule). All handed objects are chiral, but 
not all chiral objects are handed. An example of a non-handed chiral molecule is 
Pt(NH3)(NO2)(NC5H5)(Cl)(Br)(I), with Pt in the center of an octahedron 
(King 2003, p. 160). 
57 Slater (2005, pp. 31-41) suggests that each of the following questions may be 
answered ‘yes’ or ‘no’: Do enantiomers differ (1) structurally, (2) dispositionally, 
(3) in kind? He concludes: “if, as a consequence, essentialism must go by the way-
side, then so be it.”  
58 There is only an extrinsic difference (Le Poidevin 2000). Chirality of molecules 
supports realism about space. Enantiomerism requires reference to a global prop-
erty of space.  
59 The ionic compound 40Ar35Cl+ may form at high levels of chloride in the plasma of 
ICPMS (inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry), thus interfering with the 
analysis of arsenic, because 40Ar35Cl+ has the same mass as 75As+. 
60 Almost always the variety of chemical properties is talked about in terms of elec-
trons and chemical bonding. However, this overlooks the nuclei of atoms, which 
have a “subtle and largely unknown effect on chemical phenomena” (Pagni 2009). 
61 For a general argument claiming that virtually all general concepts are family 
resemblance concepts, see Ma & van Brakel 2016, ch. 4. 
62 Matter in general and its relation to energy and bonding of fundamental particles 
is the subject of particle physics. 
63 Bachelard 1940, p. 45. See for a discussion of Bachelard’s metachemistry Nord-
mann 2006. 
64 Cited in van Brakel 2006, p. 74. In passing it may be noted that before 1900, there 
have been many thoughtful philosophers in the Western tradition who defended a 
form of anti-atomism, including Aristotle and Kant. 
65 It could be argued that atomism was soon undermined by quantum mechanics. If 
energy is the fundamental stuff of the world (and matter a derived form), this 
would also be a world of stuff, not of individuals. However, this has not yet 
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changed the dominance of what has been called pseudo-scientific metaphysics 
(Ladyman & Ross 2006, p. 17). One might argue that nanochemistry has moved 
materials science further into the atomistic paradigm. 
66 I use the word ‘stuff’ in the sense of the German word ‘Stoff’, which can be un-
derstood as (a mixture of) a mass of solid, liquid, or gaseous material, primarily in 
its unformed state, and derivatively as the material(s) out of which material ob-
jects are constructed (whether by nature, engineers, artists, tailors, etc.). The stuff 
a thing consists of is not the same as its parts; stuff discourse is not about things, 
but about properties of things. See the work of Hacker and Soentgen reviewed in 
van Brakel 2012b, § 2. The word Stoff is usually translated into English either by 
substance or by material, depending on context. The word stuff may be considered 
the everyday label for the more scientific notion of material, defined as a quantity 
of matter. 
67 Note that because of the deep disposition to think and speak in terms of individu-
als or atoms, ordinary language makes it difficult to formulate the stuff view easi-
ly. (Discussions about incommensurability could be applied here. What is the me-
ta-language that opposing participants in the discussion should use when com-
municating?) 
68 It has been suggested that atoms should be thought of as affordances, not as enti-
ties (Harré & Llored 2011, 2013). 
69 Properties at the nanoscale may be a function of particle size. In some cases color 
may be a function of particle size in the micrometer range. 
70 Chad Hansen is the originator of this so-called ‘mass noun hypothesis’; see for a 
brief discussion and references to the relevant literature Ma and van Brakel (2015, 
ch. 6). By ‘ancient China’, I refer to the time of Confucius, Laozi, Mozi, Zhuang-
zi, and Mencius, the ‘Spring and Autumn’ period and the ‘Warring States’ period 
(722-221 BCE). In modern scientific terminology one could contrast starting with 
the big bang and ‘dividing down’ or starting with fundamental particles and ‘add-
ing up’. 
71 What is said about non-stoichiometric materials in this Section is taken from van 
Brakel 2012b, §§3, 12. 
72 These compositional formulas are not universally accepted. 
73 However, also in this case it is possible to argue that Fe2+O2- is doped with the 
impurity Fe3+; three Fe2+ being replaced by two Fe3+. 
74 The most common form of non-stoichiometry involves a solid phase/lattice in 
which some atoms are missing or found in excess in the solid. If another element 
replaces the missing atoms, also called impurity materials, one may prefer to con-
sider the non-stoichiometric material as a solid solution, an impure substance. 
75 There is no consensus concerning the thermodynamics of ‘perfect crystal lattices’. 
76 Perhaps more commonly referred to as Ar·5.67H2O. Also clathrates may be non-
stoichiometric, because of unfilled vacancies, apparent from writing, for example: 
MxSi136 (M = Na, Cs with 0 < x < 24). 
77 Sometimes berthollides (‘pure’ non-stoichiometric substances) and substances 
with variable composition are distinguished. 
78 For references to Wald’s many publications see van Brakel 2013. 
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79 Wald also argued that the choice of chemical space (cf. next Section), ordered in 
terms of pure substances or species, is a convention. Other ordering principles are 
possible (although perhaps less practical). 
80 Composites might be understood in the sense of Aristotle’s mixts; see Bensaude-
Vincent 1998, 2009, Needham 2009. 
81 Intermetallic compounds (Ni3Al, TiAl) are to be distinguished from interstitial 
compounds (Fe3C, Cr4C). At first the latter were considered solutions.  
82 Chemistry in the narrow sense focuses on chemical substances and species that 
obey the laws of definite, multiple, and reciprocal proportions.  
83 A sample is a bit of stuff or material; hence also defined as a quantity of matter. 
84 Paneth’s simple substance corresponds to IUPAC’s “pure chemical substance 
composed of atoms with the same number of protons in the atomic nucleus”. 
Basic substance corresponds to IUPAC’s ‘chemical element’. (“A species of at-
oms; all atoms with the same number of protons in the atomic nucleus.”) 
85 Paneth 1931, cited from the 2002 reprint of the 1962 English translation. At about 
the same time as Paneth, Meyerson distinguished elements taken in their atomic 
state and taken in their molecular state, a view somewhat similar to Paneth’s dis-
tinction between basic substances and simple substances (van Brakel 2012a, p. 32). 
There is no easy translation of Grundstoff and einfacher Stoff. Cf. Ruthenberg’s 
(2009) critique of Earley’s (2009) terminological proposals.  
86 Scerri (2009) and Wang & Schwarz (2009) have proposed to consider free atoms 
as a category fundamentally different from the notions of basic and simple sub-
stance. The periodic system is based on bound atoms, not on free atoms. A free 
atom in absolute vacuum may be considered the subject of physics. 
87 Hendry (2006a, 2012a) is right to say that atomic number of an atom or element 
survives all changes, but it is less clear what else does. Other microstructural 
properties continually change (cf. Earley 2006). 
88 “One simple substance may occur in different (allotropic) forms” (Paneth 1931, 
pp. 131, 143). 
89 Hydrogen and deuterium have different phase diagrams and critical points. The 
triple point of hydrogen is 13.96 K. The triple point of deuterium is 18.73 K, 
which has been proposed as a reference fixing property for defining a point on the 
temperature scale. 
90 For example, so called plastic sulphur and its crystallization into amorphous or 
glassy sulphur concerns a mixture of catena sulphur and cyclo sulphur. Such 
mixed phases of allotropes may also be referred to as intermediate phases. There 
are polymeric forms of sulphur and other elements, which are called allotropes, 
but in polymer chemistry, polymerization is considered a chemical reaction. 
91 C24, C28, C30, C32, C44, C50, C60, C70, C72, C76, C84, C240, C320, C540, and more. A 
large fullerene may encapsulate a smaller one: C84@C960, C240@C540. 
92 Allotropic (and polymorphic) conversions can be reversible (classically or not) or 
are irreversible.  
93 (O2)4 complexes belong to oxygen. [O3
.O3] complexes belong to ozone. Accord-
ing to IUPAC definitions, ozone and oxygen are different forms of the same sim-
ple substance. 
94 Free radicals and ions play important roles in chemical reaction mechanisms.  
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95 More precisely, huaxue may be translated as (depending on context): science of 
becoming, influencing, (material) changing into, turning into, transforming, con-
verting, digesting, incinerating, melting, dissolving, thawing. 
96 Below a temperature of 2 K, Helium-4 converts into a superfluid. Helium-3 has a 
different phase diagram and at least two superfluid phases. 
97 For concrete case studies of synthesis see, for example: Goodwin 2008, 2009a, 
Hettema 2012b, Rosenfeld & Bhushan 2000. The theoretical entity is the model, 
which the production of the material substance tries to copy. 
98 Drug design (and perhaps what is called retrosynthetic analysis) might be an ex-
ample approximating a logic of discovery. For a discussion of retrosynthetic anal-
ysis see Goodwin 2008. 
99 This paragraph derives from Schummer 2010, p. 176. 
100 Chemical species are dynamic entities and most chemical substances are not in a 
state of thermodynamic equilibrium (Brazhkin 2006). However, the factor of time 
is a relatively neglected feature in the philosophy of chemistry (Weininger 2000, p. 
147). 
101 Bachelard already stressed, in connection with chemistry, that becoming defines 
itself underneath being. When substances are in (catalytic) reaction the meaning 
of words like ‘presence’ or ‘co-existence’ is not clear anymore (Bachelard 1940, p. 
55). 
102 Bhushan has argued that neither substance, nor process is needed as a metaphysi-
cal requirement, if we accept the particularism of clusters of contingent proper-
ties. “We will need to give up essential properties, contingent properties can give 
us all the stability we need to account for chemical continuity as well as change” 
(Bhushan 2007, p. 293). 
103 Schummer 1996, pp. 215-23. Substances and reactivities mutually define each 
other. Each chemical substance refers to all the others; knowing about a chemical 
substance includes knowing how it is located among other substances and how it 
behaves in all chemical reactions in which it can take part. An earlier representa-
tive of this view is Bachelard. 
104 The separation of simple and compound substances is not fuzzy. 
105 The distinction between inclusion and addition compounds or complexes may be 
illustrated with the following example. After decomposition of the binary inclu-
sion complex [Cu(HCOO)2(H2O)2] 2H2O, it is followed by decomposition of 
the addition compound Cu(HCOO)2(H2O)2. Coordination compounds are a 
special case of addition compounds. Molecular addition compounds in alloys and 
mixed salts may have variable composition. Some addition compounds may exist 
in metastable equilibrium. 
106 It has been suggested that chemical structure theory is more like a rich sign lan-
guage than a depiction of individual molecular structures (Schummer 2010, p. 
172). 
107 An example of classification problems is the confusing terminology concerning 
guest-host structures. The addition of huge numbers of novel guest-host struc-
tures has added to the terminological confusion. Among others, the following ex-
pressions have been used differently by different authors, sometimes speaking of a 
compound, sometimes of a complex, modified by nouns such as: addition, inclu-
sion, adduct, cage, clathrate, cascade, supermolecule.  
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108 See Scerri 2007a, 2009, 2012, Wang & Schwarz 2009, and Leach 2013 and many 
contributions on this theme in the journal Foundations of Chemistry. 
109 The elements of the periodic system, understood as conceptual or theoretical 
notions, might be considered natural kinds. 
110 Nowadays there is such a thing as the chemical production of biological instru-
ments to produce chemical substances with desired biological properties. The 
boundary between (some) chemical kinds and (some) biological kinds fades away. 
111 The notion of natural materials can remain in the sense that work in the laborato-
ry is engaged in making and characterizing artifacts in order to provide infor-
mation on ‘natural’ materials. 
112 This does not apply to some of the esoteric states of matter elsewhere in the uni-
verse. 
113 Many more related remarks have been made; most of them already before 2000; 
see for an overview van Brakel 2000, ch. 5 and for the most comprehensive survey 
today Hettema 2012a. Since Bogaard 1978 and Woolley 1978, later authors have 
not added much, except abundant detail. 
114 For all features of the periodic system causing problems for the reductive program 
see Scerri 2007a, ch. 9. 
115 Earley (2012) pointed out that molecular structure generally depends on contin-
gent historical circumstances of synthesis and separation. 
116 Hettema (2012a) says quantum chemistry is not reductive in the eliminative sense 
intended by Kemeny and Oppenheim, but it can be reduced in Nagel’s sense. The 
interpretation of Nagel’s view is contested. It could be argued, as Nagel seemed to 
do himself, that the requirement to add ‘suitable supplementary principles’ (re-
duction postulates) meant that one cannot really speak of reduction (van Brakel 
2000, pp. 51-6). 
117 See Needham 2010, van Brakel 2000, pp. 51-56; 2004. Hettema (2012a) remarks 
several times that “to a significant degree” reductive and non-reductive views on 
the unity of science can be reconciled (pp. 56, 251, 296, 404). 
118 See also van Brakel 1997, pp. 267-8. Adherents of QTAIM (quantum theory of 
atoms in molecules) will say that this criticism is superficial and irrelevant. For a 
more detailed philosophical analysis see Hettema (2013, p. 324), who concludes 
that QTAIM does use a number of additional theorems for its construction.   
119 As to epistemological and ontological/metaphysical reductionism, I happen to 
believe that this distinction cannot be made so neatly as is generally assumed. Cf. 
McIntyre 1997. 
120 Cf. Vemulapalli 2012, p. 200. This point was already made by Bogaard (1978, p. 
348). Cf. Ladyman and Ross 2007, p. 44. 
121 See also Sutcliffe and Woolley 2014.  
122 Decoherence has been suggested as a way to model the ‘creation’ of molecular 
structure by the environment. Sutcliffe & Woolley (2011, p. 94) remark “modern 
formulations under the chic heading of ‘decoherence’ [… also] start with some 
primitive notion of structure built in […] crucial ideas are put in by hand at the 
outset.” 
123 Assume all matter consists of quarks and leptons, but this is still a long way from 
atoms. For example, the relation of a proton to its three constituting quarks is far 
from clear.  
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124 Information about the classical world has to be used in ‘deriving’ classical physics 
from quantum physics (Bishop 2010). In discussing the relation to quantum me-
chanics, the latter is taken for granted, although nobody knows what the ontology 
of quantum mechanics is (Lombardi & Castagnino 2010). 
125 Concerning the alleged reduction of chemical thermodynamics and statistical 
mechanics see van Brakel 2000, §5.2 and the publications of Primas and Sklar re-
viewed there. 
126 The general philosophical question is: “How does ‘everything’ fit together in the 
world(s)?” For some idea of the great variety of interdiscourse relations and alter-
native definitions of reduction, supervenience, etc. see Hendry 2012c, Hettema 
2012a, Needham 2010b, Scerri 2007b, van Brakel 1996, 2003, 2010, Vemulapalli 
2003. 
127 Denying reduction to physics does not exclude physics being ubiquitous in the 
sense that it has something to say about events in every specific domain (but not 
everything). 
128 Several authors have pointed out that philosophy of mind can learn from the 
study of interdiscourse relations in the philosophy of chemistry (e.g. Earley 2008, 
Newman 2008, p. 52). 
129 In addition, philosophy of chemistry provides ideal test cases to compare what 
scientists actually do with various philosophical proposals of interdiscourse rela-
tions (Llored 2012). 
130 Cf. Hettema 2012a, p. 202: each theory is connected with many others in many 
different ways. 
131 For the complexities of this relation see van Brakel 1986; 2000, chs. 3-4, Primas 
1985, Hettema 2012a. For a sustained defense of the microstructural approach to 
the reduction of substances to molecular structure see Hendry 2008b. In addition 
there are “entities that are intermediate between the molecular and the substance” 
(Weininger 2000, p. 154). 
132 On the relation of vernacular and scientific notions of substance, water, acidity, 
and other chemical concepts see Chang 2007, 2012, Hendry 2012d, van Brakel 
1986, pp. 294-6, 305-6). Chang argues concerning the concept of acidity that “the 
everyday concept is the unifying force that holds together a plurality of scientific 
concepts.” On the vernacular use of water see Ruthenberg 2012 and other papers 
in that volume. 
133 For example, one might think that temperature is the average kinetic energy of 
molecules. This is incorrect. It may be true for ideal gases, but not generally, 
whereas temperature is involved in both equilibrium and kinetic considerations. 
See Primas 1985; 1991, pp. 163-4; van Brakel 1986, p. 313; 1997, pp. 267-8; Need-
ham 2010. Can the laws of Fourier and Fick be reduced to the equations of irre-
versible thermodynamics or to statistical mechanics? 
134 For more detail see van Brakel 1999; 2004, pp. 25-7, 30-4; 2010, pp. 123-4, 130-2. 
135 See on the indeterminacy of event identification van Brakel 2004; 2010, pp. 132-3). 
136 Unification can mean many things (van Brakel 2003, pp. 35-6). Consistency is an 
important feature of unification, but it may be necessary to allow for paracon-
sistent logic. 
137 As when it is said that quantum mechanics cannot distinguish between (ste-
reo)isomers. According to Le Poidevin (2005), nothing can differ in terms of 
atomic valency without also differing in terms of electronic configuration. But as 
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Scerri (2007c) points out, the sulphur atom can display different valences depend-
ing on the compounds to which it belongs though there is only one unique ‘un-
derlying’ electronic configuration. That is to say, multiple realization of the ‘low-
er’ level in the ‘higher’ level. 
138 Harré (2006) uses chemistry/biology as an example of supervenience. Scerri & 
McIntyre (1997, pp. 225-6) mention smell as an example and Newman’s (2008) 
prime example is water. When supervenience is mentioned in the context of quan-
tum mechanics, no concrete examples are given; only general comments on the 
difference of reduction, emergence, and supervenience in relation to physicalism 
(Bishop 2005, Hendry 2010a). 
139 To combat terminological ambiguity, reduction might be defined as the opposite 
of emergence (van Brakel 2010, pp. 128-30). See for discussion of downward cau-
sation and emergence: Hendry 2006b; 2010a, pp. 187-90; Scerri 2007c, 2012. 
140 Amalgamation in this context is to be understood ‘exactly’ in analogy with its 
meaning in chemistry (Woody 2012, p. 459f). 
141 Cf. also Bishop and Atmanspacher 2006, Llored 2012. 
142 Blending of concepts into hybrid concepts has also been suggested as an im-
portant feature of translation and interpretation across widely different traditions, 
for example classical Chinese and European languages and traditions (Richards 
1932; Ma & van Brakel 2016, ch. 10). 
143 See Vemulapalli 2008, showing the convoluted relations of micro- and macro-
discourses when identifying components, substances, and species, or calculating 
their properties. An absolute and strict separation between macroscopic and mi-
croscopic descriptions is not possible and does not make sense. 
144 As philosophers of an empirical bend are well aware, the world itself is a posit, 
which lacks extension except when a particular intensional context is provided 
(van Fraassen 2002, p. 24). For the plural ‘worlds’ see Goodman 1978. 
145 A strict separation between different discourses is not needed (and not possible) 
and primarily serves as a model imposed on a messy world. We should neither 
speak of unified nor of disunified science, but of a variegated interconnected 
patchwork (van Brakel 2010, p. 134). I have also referred to it as a “fluid dimen-
sional patchwork” (2004, p. 34). 
146 S weakly supervenes on B if and only if necessarily any two things that have the 
same properties in domain B have the same properties in domain S (that is, B-
indiscernibility entails S-indiscernibility). S globally supervenes on B if and only if 
any two worlds that are B-indiscernible are also S-indiscernible. There are many 
paraphrases of ‘S supervenes on B’; for example: B underlies S, B grounds S, etc. 
(van Brakel 1996, pp. 255-9). 
147 Cf. also Glymour’s (2004) review of Earley 2003a. 
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